Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Kansa: Collecting WMI Event Consumer backdoors

In my previous post, Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis, I discussed the Windows Service related collectors and analysis capabilities in Kansa and noted that some of the collected data is not currently collected by Sysinternals' Autoruns.

Today I'll cover another persistence mechanism that Kansa collects, which is not currently collected by Autoruns; namely WMI Event Consumers. That link tells us "Event consumers are applications or scripts that request notification of events, and then perform tasks when specific events occur."
[Update: 2014-05-13] Mark Russinovich released a new version of Autoruns today that reports WMI information. I have not tested it yet. It will be interesting to see if it only reports data form Event Consumers and not the Event Filter, which tells what the trigger is.

For an event consumer to work, three elements are required:
  • An Event Consumer -- this is the piece that performs some action
  • An Event Filter -- an event query watching for defined activity -- this triggers the consumer
  • A Filter-to-Consumer Binding -- this links the filter to the consumer
In my experience, WMI Event Consumers are not commonly used. So in many situations collecting the data and simply reviewing file sizes can tell you if something is worth investigating further. For example, I recently collected event consumer data from a few thousand hosts. Running the following Powershell command was enough to find which host contained a backdoor running from an event consumer:

ls *wmievtconsmr.xml | sort length -Descending | more

The output of that command follows, see if you can determine which host had the backdoor installed:
If you guessed DFWBOSSWEE01, congratulations, you may have the skills necessary to find WMI Event Consumer backdoors.

So what's in this file? Since it was collected with Kansa's Get-WMIEvtConsumer collector, which specifies its output should be written to an XML file, we can either open the XML file in a suitable editor or use the Powershell cmdlet Import-Clixml to read the file into a variable and examine the contents via the following commands:

$data = Import-Clixml .\DFWBOSSWEE01_wmievtconsmr.xml
$data | more

This command returns output like the following:
The most interesting bits above are those in the "CommandLineTemplate" property, which I've redacted a bit, but you can see there's a call to Powershell.exe and a long base 64 encoded string, which in this case was a Powershell encoded command, in essence, a script. We can decode that script via

[Convert]::ToBase64String()

Doing so would reveal that when this WMI Event Consumer is triggered, it connects to a remote site and downloads another script and runs it.

So how often is it triggered? What triggers it? To answer those questions, you'll have to review the data Kansa collected via Get-WMIEvtFilter.ps1. A consumer by itself is harmless, but if there's an Event Filter and a Filter-to-Consumer binding, then you've got all the ingredients needed for a WMI Event Consumer based backdoor.

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