Thursday, February 2, 2012

Finding DNSChanger Victims

Per Brian Krebs' article about DNSChanger Trojan at least half of the Fortune 500 still has infected hosts. I thought I'd post this quick one-liner that may help some folks find these infected hosts in their networks.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/malware_110911/image/dns-malware-graphic


First, find a machine that you know is configured correctly for DNS for the network you're wanting to search. If you're at that machine's console, open a DOS prompt and run the following command (mind the linewraps):

reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\tcpip\parameters /s | 
find "NameServer"
The result should look something like this:
     NameServer         REG_SZ    
     DhcpNameServer     REG_SZ    192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.253.1
Obviously you may have different IP addresses for your name servers. Verify that the information is correct. Highlight the line in the response that is correct and paste it to your clipboard. Because my environment uses DHCP just about everywhere and DHCP assigns name server information, I highlight only that line and use a loop as shown below to scan multiple hosts:
for /L %i in (2, 1, 254) do 
reg query \\192.168.n.%i\hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\tcpip\parameters /s | 
find "DhcpNameServer" | find /V  
"    DhcpNameServer    REG_SZ    192.168.1.1 192.168.1.2 192.168.253.1" > 192.168.n.%i
Note that the second "find" statement in the command above will only pull out lines that don't match the supplied string. The output from this command will be written to files named for the IP addresses of the devices you are querying, those files that are not zero length, indicate systems that have some DNS setting that doesn't match what you know to be a good configuration. You may have to tweak this a bit for your situation, but you get the general idea.

Several people sent me information on IP address for known rogue DNS servers, according to the (unsigned) FBI document here, the rogue DNS servers fall into the following IP ranges:

start rangeend range
85.255.112.085.255.127.255
67.210.0.067.210.15.255
93.188.160.093.188.167.255
77.67.83.077.67.83.255
213.109.64.0213.109.79.255
64.28.176.064.28.191.255


Feedback appreciated.

Monday, December 26, 2011

Check the uids and gids

While working on body-outliers, the Python script I wrote to do statistical analysis on fls bodyfiles in an effort to find malicious files in compromised file systems, one of the things I was ignoring completely, but that stuck out like a sore thumb when reviewing the data, was user and group IDs for files in Unix and Linux file systems.

When attackers build their kits that they intend to drop on remote hosts as backdoors, packet sniffers, key loggers, etc., they often use tar and gzip to create compressed archives of those files, then they can issue a command like wget to download the archive to the compromised host where they will "untar" the archive and move their malicious binaries into desired paths on the system.

One of the "features" of tar, as the manpage tells us is, "by default, newly-created files are owned by the user running tar." This means that if the attacker is logged into his own system as a non-root user and he's are compiling binaries which will replace legitimate binaries on the target system, those binaries will retain his user and group id information when they are tar'd up. Of course a careful, thoughtful attacker can take a variety of countermeasures to change this, but many are not so careful.

As a result, when they install malicious code on target systems, there's a chance those binaries will be installed with user IDs and group IDs (henceforth uid and gid) that don't match other files in those locations. These are obvious outliers and as I was working on the next version of body-outliers, I had written the code to calculate the average uid and gid values on a per directory basis, then calculate standard deviation, then alert on the outliers, but this sort of statistical analysis didn't make sense for uids and gids, because for the most part, they are uniform throughout the file system, with a few exceptions like /tmp, /var/spool/cron, /var/spool/mail and many custom software packages, but many system directories like /dev, /bin, /usr, etc. are set uid and gid 0, meaning the files are owned by the root account and belong to the root group. In this context, standard deviation didn't make much sense, so I modified my code to do another form of statistical analysis; namely calculating distributions.

Calculating distributions is just fancy talk for counting the occurrences of a thing, say, how many files are uid 0, how many are uid 1000, and so on, then displaying this information. This type of analysis lends itself well to finding oddball uid and gid files in compromised *nix file systems. On the hacked system I spoke of during my SECTor 2011 talk (video, slides), finding these unusual uid and gid files correlates very well to finding attacker code for precisely the reasons described above.

Here's a sample run of the script, which I'm calling body-ugid-dist.py, run against the same bodyfile as the one in the SECTor talk, this has been trimmed down a bit:
./body-ugid-dist.py --file sda1_bodyfile.txt --meta uid
[+] Checking command line arguments.
[+] sda1_bodyfile.txt may be a bodyfile.
[+] Discarded 0 files named .. or .
[+] Discarded 0 bad lines from sda1_bodyfile.txt.
[+] Added 20268 paths to meta.

...

Path:  /etc/cron.daily
==========================
Count:       1  uid:  1000
Count:       9  uid:     0

...

Path:  /usr/lib
==========================
Count:       1  uid:    10
Count:       1  uid:    37
Count:       1  uid:  1000
Count:    2082  uid:     0

...

In actuality this script returns 499 lines of output, representing about 350 "Counts," most of which were specific to the custom application running on the system. But the overall bodyfile had more than 200 thousand lines, so this is a considerable reduction in data, which is vital to any investigation. What the above output tells us is that of the 10 files in /etc/cron.daily, nine of them are uid 0 and one is uid 1000, that's a lead that may be worth pursuing and indeed, in this case, it is malicious code. The next entry shows tht /usr/lib contains 2085 files with 2082 of them being uid 0 and three others that are one offs and certainly worth looking into. In that case, two of the three are malicious code.

body-ugid-dist.py is available from my github repo. Unfortunately, it's only going to be useful for *nix cases. Running it is quite simple, the usage is shown below:
./body-ugid-dist.py 
usage: body-ugid-dist.py [-h] --file FILENAME [--meta META]

This script parses an fls bodyfile and returns the uid or gid distribution on
a per directory basis.

optional arguments:
  -h, --help       show this help message and exit
  --file FILENAME  An fls bodyfile, see The Sleuth Kit.
  --meta META      --meta can be "uid" or "gid." Default is "uid"
I wrote about this previously for the SANS Digital Forensics Blog If this kind of analysis interests you, join me for SANS 508: Advanced Computer Forensic Analysis & Incident Response in Phoenix in February of 2012.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Fourth Amendment Hard Disk Wipe

Recently I replied to a thread on a mailing list about wiping hard disk drives.
source: http://cheezburger.com/tehpeanutbutterkitteh/lolz/View/2735751680

I'd just spent a few hours over a recent weekend playing around with the hdparm command in Linux because it has the ability to use the ATA Secure Erase feature, which is much faster and more comprehensive than software wipe utilities like the trusty Darik's Boot and Nuke. For example, I recently wiped a 500GB drive in just over two hours.

I was experimenting with hdparm and secure erase because I wanted to try it out and because I was prepping an old drive to give to a friend. After the secure erase finished and I verified that the drive contained no data, I wrote a little shell script to overwrite the entire thing with the text of the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Something I was inspired to do after reading about @ioerror's overwriting usb sticks with the Bill of Rights.


I mentioned this script on a mailing list and a friend replied that I was "so subversive." Now, I'm almost certain the reply was in jest and that he doesn't honestly feel that way, but I suspect there are folks who do think it's subversive. I think it's a sad commentary on the state of the U.S. collective psyche when we consider Constitutional guarantees as subversive.

A handful of people replied to me that they wanted the script. Well, it's not pretty, nor fast and Hal Pomeranz and a thousand other Unix beards could probably come up with a better solution, but it works. I've added a measure of protection to it because I imagine some people will screw themselves with this, so be careful, mind your devices.

#!/bin/bash
# This is a hack I wrote to overwrite $1 with the 4th Amendment.
# It's not pretty, it's not fast, but it works.
# If $1 is a device, when it's full, errors will be thrown and not handled.
# If $1 is not a device, the block device that it resides on will eventually
# fill up, if this script is left running.

# The next line will cause the script to exit on any errors, like
# when the device is full. Hey, I said it was a hack.
set -e

echo "This hack overwrites $1 with the text of the 4th Amendment."
echo "ALL DATA WILL BE LOST."

echo "Are you absofrigginlutely sure you want to continue?"
select yn in "Yes" "No"; do
    case $yn in
        Yes ) exec > $1
            while : 
                do echo "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, " \
                "houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and " \
                "seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, " \
                "but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and " \
                "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the " \
                "persons or things to be seized.";
                done;;
        No ) exit;;
    esac
done

To use this save it as a shell script on a Linux system and invoke it from the command line as <command name> <device name>. When the device is full, the program will exit on error. Enjoy.

Sunday, October 23, 2011

Egress Filtering

“It is not what enters into the mouth that defiles the man, but what proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles the man.”
-- Jesus

White Hat Security's Jeremiah Grossman recently tweeted the following quotes from info sec legend Dan Geer:





Geer is a genius, there can be no doubt. However, when I read this, it bothered me. I have worked in large enterprises where knowing everything was nearly impossible and yet default-deny egress filtering was in place and effective at limiting loss.

Certainly implementing a default-deny egress filter without careful planning will be a resume generating event, but not implementing it due to incomplete knowledge may have the same result.

And as I said in response to Jeremiah's tweets on Twitter, implementing a default deny quickly leads to knowledge, but again, you're going to want to do this in a well-communicated and coordinated way, with careful planning throughout the organisation and management chain.

Friday, August 19, 2011

Fuzzy Hashing and E-Discovery

Recent work has made me consider an interesting role fuzzy hashes could play in E-Discovery.

In the last year I've worked a few intellectual property theft cases where Company A has sued Company B claiming Company B stole IP from Company A in the form of documents, design drawings, spreadsheets, contracts, etc.

In these cases Company A has requested that Company B turn over all documents that may pertain to Company A or Company A's work product, etc. with specific search terms provided and so on.

Company B argues they can't comply with Company A's request because they have documents relating to Company A and Company A's work product as a result of market research for the purposes of strategic planning and that turning over all of those documents would damage Company B.

In such cases, if Company A is concerned that Company B has stolen specific documents, maybe a better approach would be to request that Company B run ssdeep or another fuzzy hashing tool against all of their documents and turn over the fuzzy hashes.

Company A can then review the fuzzy hash results from Company B without knowing anything about the documents those hashes came from. They can compare the set of hashes provided by Company B against the set of fuzzy hashes generated from their own documents and make an argument to the judge to compel Company B to turn over those documents that match beyond a certain threshold.

24:DZL3MxMsqTzquAxQ+BP/te7hMHg9iGCTMyzGVmZWImQjXIvTvT/X7FJf8XLVw:J3oy+x/te7qmNmlYvX/xp8W

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Facebook Artifact Parser

If you have a Facebook account, take a look under the hood some time by viewing the source in your browser while you're logged in. Imagine having to deal with all of that for a digital forensics investigation. It's mind numbing, especially if all you want is who said what and when. I spent the better part of today brushing up on Python's regular expression implementation and put together this Facebook Artifact Parser that does a decent job of parsing through Facebook artifacts found on disk (as of the time of this writing).

In my case, I made use of this by first recovering several MB worth of Facebook artifacts from disk and I combined all of these elements into one file. Having done that, run this script from the command line giving the name of the file as the only argument. It works on multiple files as well.

Sunday, August 7, 2011

Yahoo! Messenger Decoder Updated

I'm working yet another case that involves Yahoo! Messenger Archives. I tried using JAD Software's excellent Internet Evidence Finder for this and it worked pretty well, but in the interest of double-checking my tools, I brushed off my old yahoo_msg_decoder.py script that I'd written a few years ago. It used to be interactive, meaning it was run with no arguments and would prompt for a username and a filename to parse, this was less than ideal for parsing a large number of files.

I have remedied that situation. The script now takes three arguments, one optional. The first is the username for the archive. Yahoo! Messenger Archives are xor'd with the username. The second argument is the name of the other party to the conversation and the third argument is the name of the dat file to process.

The nice thing about this is that you can now create a for loop like the following from a Linux environment and parse multiple files at once:

for i in $(ls *.dat); do echo; echo "== Parsing $i =="; yahoo_msg_decoder.py --username=joebob --other_party=billybob --file=$i; echo "== Finished parsing $i =="; echo; done


The output of this for loop can be redirected to a file.

My script is still not perfect. On some dat files it doesn't properly xor the data and yields garbage. I have not determined why that is the case yet.

As for IEF, I'm not sure why, but running it over the same dat files as my script, it dropped some portions of the conversation. I will be reporting the issue to JAD. But it's yet another reminder of the importance of testing your tools and confirming results.

update: After posting this, I remembered that Jeff Bryner had written a utility for this and it is still vastly superior to my own. I just verified that the link I have to his yim2text still works. Check it out.

Grand Canyon Rim to Rim: New Gear and Best Intentions

I pulled my late 1980s backpack out of storage. My first thought was that it was heavier than I remembered, just over seven pounds empty. Ba...